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PRESUMPTIONS AND THE NEW RULES OF
EVIDENCE IN MINNESOTA
By PETER N. THOMPSONt
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence' promises to have
far reaching impact on trial practice throughout the country in both
the federal and state courts. As was the case with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Federal.Rules of Evidence are serving as a model
for codification in the states.' Accordingly, Minnesota is presently in
the process of codifying rules of evidence, using the federal rules as a
guide.3 As the Federal experience illustrates, one of the more trouble-
some questions facing the drafters of the Minnesota rules is the effect
to be given evidentiary presumptions.
The questions relating to presumptions mark an area of evidence
law that is in need of codification on the federal and state level. Not-
withstanding the great wealth of literature and case law analyzing the
relationship between presumptions, inferences, and burden of persua-
sion, the controversies in this area are largely unresolved.4 Although
codification of a rule dealing with presumptions will not eliminate the
problems per se, the adoption of a well-drafted rule can serve as a
tA.B., DePauw University, 1969, J.D. University of Michigan, 1972. Professor Thompson is
an Associate Professor of Law at the William Mitchell College of Law. He is also the Reporter
for the Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee for Uniform Rules of Evidence. The
views expressed in this article are the author's views and not necessarily the views of the Advisory
Committee.
I. See FED. R. EVID. The Rules became effective July 1, 1975. See 28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. V,
1975). For a concise statement of the procedural history of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1974), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. FED. R. EVID.
799-800 (1975).
2. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 47.020 (1973); ME. R. EVID., reprinted in 8 ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
at 269 (Supp. 1975); N.M.R. EvID., reprinted in 4 N.M. STAT. ANN. at 115 (Supp. 1975); Wis.
R. EVID., reprinted in 40L Wis. STAT. ANN. at 1 (1975). See also UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
(1974).
3. With legislative authority under MINN. STAT. § 480.0591 (1974) the Minnesota Supreme
Court appointed an advisory committee to consider and to recommend a set of evidentiary rules
for promulgation by the court. The committee has been meeting regularly since August, 1974.
In June, 1976, the committee's preliminary draft along with committee comments were circu-
lated to the bench and bar for public comment and debate. The committee used the recently
enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as a model. In the absence of a strong conflicting state
policy, the federal rule was recommended. PROPOSED UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR MIN-
NESOTA STATE COURTS, preliminary comment (1976).
4. One commentator "ventures the assertion that 'presumption' is the slipperiest member of
the family of legal terms, except for its first cousin, 'burden of proof.' " C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342, at 802-03 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK].
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starting point. The appropriate considerations that must be addressed
in dealing with the issues raised can be identified and the bar's atten-
tion can be directed to the proper vehicle for resolving the problems.
The purpose of this article is not to join in the debate between the
advocates of the "flitting bats" as opposed to the "non-bursting
bubbles," but rather to relate in a straightforward manner the status
of both the statutory and common law of presumptions in Minnesota
and the practical effects that would accompany the adoption of the
federal rule by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
II. THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE
The conflict and debate in the area of presumptions is demonstrated
in the history of the enactment of federal rule 301. In the process of
drafting the federal rule, the United States Supreme Court Advisory
Committee, the House of Representatives, and the Senate each advo-
cated a different position as to the proper effect to be given evidentiary
presumptions. The Senate version, which represents a codification of
the Thayer5-Wigmore6 theory of presumptions, eventually prevailed.
The enacted rule provides:7
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by
Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such
party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion,
which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was
originally cast.
The rule limits the role of presumptions to an undramatic proce-
dural mechanism for allocating the burden of producing evidence.,
The presumption satisfies the duty to produce evidence on an issue
and, if unrebutted, necessitates a directed verdict. As a procedural
mechanism it affects the outcome of the litigation only when the other
5. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW, ch. 8
passim (1898) [hereinafter cited as THAYER].
6. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2491(2) (3d ed. 1940) [here-
inafter cited as WIGMORE].
7. FED. R. EVID. 301.
8. For a discussion of the distinction between the burden of producing evidence and the burden
of persuasion, see MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at § 336; THAYER, supra note 5, at ch. 9. An un-
derstanding of this distinction is essential to the proper application of presumptions. Since the
burden of producing evidence relates only to the question of whether a judge should direct a ver-
dict or allow the issue to go to the jury, the jury need not be concerned with the burden of pro-
duction nor the presumptions which affect the burden of producing evidence. The burden of
persuasion becomes relevant only if both parties have satisfied the burden of producing evidence.
The jury is then instructed as to which party bears the burden of persuasion.
[Vol. 2
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party fails to satisfy its burden of producing evidence. If, however,
substantial evidence is produced rebutting the presumed fact, the pre-
sumption disappears and has no further function. Hence, presumptions
of this sort are described as "bats of the law flitting in the twilight, but
disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts,"9 or perhaps more com-
monly as "bursting bubbles."' 0 In theory, most states have adopted
this view of presumptions. However, among those jurisdictions that
claim to follow the Thayer-Wigmore theory, there are numerous vari-
ations in the application of the rule."
The major criticism of the "bursting bubble" theory is that too little
emphasis is given to the underlying policy reasons that established the
presumption.' The policy reasons for allocating the burden of persua-
sion, principles of fairness, probability, and public policy often overlap
or are identical with the policy reasons for the creation of a presump-
tion. It is argued, not altogether illogically, that the existence of a
presumption should have some effect on or determine the burden of
persuasion on a given issue. 3 Limiting the application of a presump-
tion to the rare situation in which the presumed fact is uncontradicted
by the opposing party, gives too little weight to the policy reasons that
resulted in the creation of presumptions."'
Accordingly, the Thayer-Wigmore theory was rejected by the United
States Supreme Court Advisory Committee in favor of a rule which
treats presumptions as affecting the burden of persuasion. The rule
proposed by the Committee provided:"
In all cases not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by
these rules a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed
fact is more probable than its existence.
However, although the Advisory Committee's draft marked the cul-
mination of thirteen years of study, public comment, and debate,"
9. See Mackowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94 S.W. 256, 262
(1906).
10. See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 345 at 821.
1I. Id. at 823-26.
12. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REv.
5, 18 (1959); Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L.
REv. 909, 913 (1937). See Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 391, 408, 410-11 (1956);
Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59,
77-83 (1933).
13. See Gausewitz, supra note 12, at 410; Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Pre-
sumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906, 931-32 (1931).
14. See authorities cited in note 12 supra.
15. 56 F.R.D. 183,208 (1972).
16. See note I supra.
1976]
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and was approved by the Supreme Court, 7 the proposal never became
operative. Congress, harboring reservations with regard to the new
rules, promptly enacted legislation requiring its approval before the
rules could be applied in the federal courts. 8 The rules were referred
to the House of Representatives for more hearings and debate.
The House of Representatives drastically altered the proposed rule
301, substituting a compromise between the Thayer-Wigmore theory
of vanishing presumptions and the theory that presumptions should
govern the burden of persuasion. The rule proposed by the House pro-
vided:'1
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by
Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with
the evidence and, even though met with contradicting evidence, a
presumption is sufficient evidence of the fact presumed, to be con-
sidered by the trier of the facts.
Thus, according to the House proposal a presumption is to be evi-
dence from which the jury could draw inferences. This approach to
presumptions has some support in case law"8 and is adopted in Min-
nesota Statutes Section 602.04, which presumes due care on the part
of the deceased in a wrongful death action.2' However, the theory has
been strongly criticized as presenting an impossible situation for a jury
since they are required to weigh sworn testimony against an evidentiary
presumption to determine which prevails.2 As indicated previously,
the House amendment was rejected by the Senate.
23
Surprisingly, none of the proposed rules defines presumption. In
the absence of an express definition, it might be appropriate2 to refer
to the definition provided in the Uniform Rules of Evidence:
25
17. See Order Promulgating the Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 184 (1972).
18. See Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
19. H.R. Res. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. H546 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
20. See Annot., 5 A.L.R. 3d 19, 35-39 (1966).
21. See notes 96-105 infra and accompanying text.
22. Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal. 2d 585, 594, 128 P.2d 16, 21 (1942) (Traynor, J., dissenting); I
JONES ON EVIDENCE § 3.6 (6th ed. S. Gard 1972); Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World,
5 VAND. L. REV. 324, 333-34 (1952); McBaine, Presumptions; Are They Evidence?, 26 CALIF.
L. REV. 519, 520 (1938); Morgan, supra note 12, at 73-74. See TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482,
491, 53 N.W.2d 468, 473 (1952); Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 562, 569, 289
N.W. 557, 560-61 (1939).
23. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9(1974), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. FED. R.
EVID. 803-04 (1975).
24. Fornoff, Presumptions-The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 ARK. L. REV. 401,
405 (1971).
25. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 13 (1953 version). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 701 (1942).
[Vol. 2
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Rule 13. A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a
rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact
or group of facts found or otherwise established in an action.
Upon the establishment of the basic facts, the presumed fact is to be
assumed. Thus, upon establishing that a letter was properly addressed,
stamped, and mailed, it is assumed that the letter was delivered.28 The
problems of who must assume the fact of delivery and the effect of
such an assumption give rise to the controversy. If the opponent of the
presumption fails to introduce evidence to rebut the assumed fact of
delivery the presumption would require that a directed verdict be
entered under each of the proposals discussed above.
If, however, the opponent introduces evidence supporting the claim
that the letter was not delivered the trial would take different direc-
tions, depending upon which rule of evidence was applicable. Under
the Advisory Committee's approach, the jury would be instructed that
the burden of persuasion on the issue of delivery rested on the party
who claimed that the letter had not been delivered. The House version
would not affect the burden of persuasion, but would require the jury
be instructed that there is a presumption in law and the jury must
weigh the presumption against the sworn testimony in determining
which preponders. The Senate version would minimize the impact of
the presumption because upon the introduction of the rebutting evi-
dence the presumption would have no further function at the trial.
Jury instructions, including the instruction as to the burden of persua-
sion, would not be influenced by the presumption.
In addition, despite the divergent approaches of the three versions,
none of them expressly deals with the problems that arise if the basic
facts are controverted. If there is proof that the letter was not placed in
the mailbox, a controversy arises as to the presence of the basic facts.
If the assumed fact of delivery is not contested, a consistent result
would be reached under all three rules. The jury would be instructed
that if they find that the letter was duly mailed they must also find that
the letter was delivered. However, if both the basic fact of mailing and
the assumed fact of delivery are contested, there would be a divergence
among the three theories in the treatment of the presumption.
The Advisory Committee rule would require an instruction that the
proponent has the burden of persuasion both as to the underlying fact
26. In re Estate of Nelson, 180 Minn. 570, 572-73, 231 N.W. 218, 219-20 (1930). This pre-
sumption probably originated because of the difficulty involved in proving delivery coupled with
the high probability that the mail service acted efficiently and delivered the letter properly. See
MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 343 at 807-08. See generally WIGMORE, supra note 6, at § 2519.
1976]
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of proper mailing and the presumed fact of delivery. However, if the
jury decides the letter was properly mailed then the burden of persua-
sion on the issue of delivery shifts to the opponent. In essence, the
burden of persuasion as to delivery is in limbo until the threshold issue
- proper mailing - is resolved. An instruction reflecting this view
can be composed but it is unlikely it would be fully understood by the
jury.
7
The jury instruction under the House version would be almost as
complex. If the jury finds the letter to have been properly mailed it is
to presume delivery. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by
the opponent's credible evidence. On the other hand, if the jury finds
the mailing to have been improper they are instructed that no pre-
sumption arises. The enacted rule, of course, would not affect the
burden of persuasion. The presumption, once rebutted, would dis-
appear and no jury instruction is required.
As these examples illustrate, the most workable rule seems to be
rule 301 adopted from the Senate version, which embodies the Thayer-
Wigmore theory. This rule can be easily applied by the trial court
without instruction. The jury is not required to engage in the confusing
process of weighing the presumption against sworn testimony; nor
must they perform the mental gymnastics required by a shifting bur-
den of persuasion. However, this rule could have the impact of mini-
mizing the underlying policy reasons that create the presumption.
III. APPLICATION OF PRESUMPTIONS IN MINNESOTA
The Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee for Uniform
Rules of Evidence has considered each of the various proposals in its
deliberations 8 on a rule dealing with presumptions. The Committee is
27. See Morgan, supra note 12, at 76-77.
28. The committee also considered the approach of the Model Code of Evidence (1942), the
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953 version) and the Cal. Evid. Code §§ 603-06 (West 1966), as
amended, (West Supp. 1976). The Model Code codifies the Thayer-Wigmore theory with the ex-
ception of the presumption of legitimacy which was to directly govern the burden of persuasion.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, ch. 8 (1942). The 1953 version of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
lumped presumptions into two categories: those presumptions based on probative value and
those presumptions based solely on social policy. The former operate to shift the burden of per-
suasion onto the opposing party. The latter shift only the burden of producing evidence. In
adopting the Uniform Rules of Evidence the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws abandoned their previous approach and adopted a rule identical to the rule
proposed by the United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee, rule 301(a).
California also divides presumptions into two categories. However, in California a presump-
tion based on probative value affects only the burden of producing evidence. Presumptions based
on social policy, inter alia those favoring the legitimacy of children, validity of marriage, and
the stability of titles, on the other hand, control the burden of persuasion. CAL. EvID. CODE §§
603-06 (West 1966), as amended, (West Supp. 1976).
[Vol. 2
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recommending that the Minnesota court adopt the enacted federal
rule 301.29 In recommending this rule the Committee did not intend to
discredit the underlying policy considerations giving rise to presump-
tions, but rather urged that these considerations be effectuated by
other means. 0
Before the impact of the adoption of the federal rule 301 can be
predicted the status of the present practice in Minnesota must be
determined. In theory, this inquiry appears to be a simple task. On
numerous occasions the supreme court has announced the rule of law
in Minnesota to be in accord with the Thayer-Wigmore rule. In prac-
tice, however, the application of the rule has been inconsistent, as is
indicated by the frequency with which the issue has been raised on
appeal. The inconsistent application may be the result either of con-
fusion as to the definition of a presumption or of improper use of
evidentiary presumptions to effectuate some underlying policy. In any
event the adoption of the approved rule should at least result in a
more uniform application.
The modern source of the law of presumptions in Minnesota stems
from the supreme court opinion in Ryan v. Metropolitan Life In-
surance Co.3 In Ryan, the plaintiff appealed adverse decisions in
consolidated actions against several insurance companies for acci-
dental death. The insurance companies defended on the ground that
the insured died as a result of suicide. Under the provisions of the
accidental death policies, plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the
death was accidental rather than suicidal. The trial court's refusal to
give an instruction on the presumption against suicide was asserted as
error on appeal.
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that its prior deci-
sions addressing the role of presumption were inconsistent 3 and at-
tempted to resolve the confusion. After weighing the competing
theories, the court adopted the Thayer-Wigmore theory which views
presumptions as mere procedural devices for allocating the burden of
producing evidence. The court ruled that if the presumed fact is un-
opposed, the party benefiting from it is entitled to a directed verdict on
the issue; however, once the presumption is met by competent evi-
dence, it disappears and the case goes to the jury without mention of
29. PROPOSED UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR MINNESOTA STATE COURTS (1976).
30. PROPOSED UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR MINNESOTA STATE COURTS, preliminary
comment (1976).
31. 206 Minn. 562, 289 N.W. 557 (1939).
32. Id. at 571, 289 N.W. at 561.
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the presumption" Thus, the court held that the refusal of the trial
judge to instruct on the presumption against suicide was proper. 4
Had the court stopped there the difficulties in applying presump-
tions and the inconsistencies of prior decisions might have been re-
solved. Instead, the court chose to add dictum that a jury instruction
may be proper which directs the jury to apply the presumption if it
rejects the evidence rebutting the presumption as not credible. 5 The
immediate effect was to perpetuate the confusion.
Generally a jury is entitled to accept or to discredit the evidence
produced during the course of a trial. This is fundamental to the fact-
finding function. The Thayer-Wigmore view of presumptions as a
procedural device only requires that the opposing party put forward
proof rebutting the presumption, at which time the presumption
vanishes. The rebutting proof need not be conclusive. If the jury rejects
the evidence rebutting the presumed fact, and there is no other credible
evidence supporting the presumed fact, the positions of the parties are
in equilibrium and the decision must be against the party having the
burden of persuasion. Yet the Ryan court stated that in the above
circumstance the party benefiting from the presumption prevails.
Thus, presumptions may be determinative of the burden of persuasion
as was advocated by the United States Supreme Court Advisory
Committee.
This conflict within the Ryan decision led to continued controversy.
In the thirteen years following Ryan, the supreme court considered the
propriety of instructing a jury on a presumption nearly a dozen
times. 6 In all the decisions, the court acknowledged the rule enunciated
33. Id. at 568, 289 N.W. at 560.
34. Id. at 569-70, 289 N.W. at 560-61.
35. Id. at 570, 289 N.W. at 561.
36. In five cases the court found the failure to instruct on a presumption not erroneous be-
cause the presumption had been rebutted. See Ammundson v. Falk, 228 Minn. 115, 121-23, 36
N.W.2d 521, 525 (1949); Roberts v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 215 Minn. 300, 306-07, 9
N.W.2d 730, 733 (1943); Ralston v. Tomlinson, 207 Minn. 485, 488, 292 N.W. 24, 26 (1940):
Hoelmer v. Sutton, 207 Minn. 140, 143, 290 N.W. 225, 227 (1940); Standard Accid. Ins. Co. v.
Minnesota Util. Co., 207 Minn. 24, 27, 289 N.W. 782, 784 (1940). In several others, the court
found instructions to the jury on a presumption were non-prejudicial. See Donea v. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 220 Minn. 204, 212-15, 19 N.W.2d 377, 382-83 (1945); Ogren v. City of
Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 563-64, 18 N.W.2d 535, 539-40 (1945): Bimberg v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
217 Minn. 187, 197-98, 14 N.W.2d 410, 415 (5-2 decision), aff'dper curiam on reargument, 217
Minn. 206, 14 N.W.2d 419, cert. denied. 323 U.S. 752 (1944) (not error to instruct as to appli-
cable law): Lang v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 208 Minn. 487, 494-95, 295 N.W. 57, 61-62 (1940).
And in Moeller v. St. Paul City Ry., 218 Minn. 353, 360, 16 N.W.2d 289, 294 (1944), the court
held an instruction on the legal effect of a presumption neither erroneous nor inconsistent with
Ryan. But see State v. One Buick Sedan Automobile, 216 Minn. 129, 134, 12 N.W.2d I, 3-4
(1943) (reversal in part on a determination that a presumption was not rebutted by the evidence).
[Vol. 2
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in Ryan, but consistently declined to reverse trial court decisions
where instructions had been given.
By 1952 the time had arrived for a reconciliation of the issues. The
court in TePoel v. Larson," a second landmark decision, stated the
problem succinctly:"
It would seem from an examination of our cases since the Ryan case
that it is neither error to give nor to refuse to instruct the jury that there
is a presumption ....
TePoel involved the application of the presumption of a decedent's
due care in defense of a claim of contributory negligence. The trial
court's instruction 9 had the effect of giving evidentiary weight to the
presumption by calling for its rebuttal by contrary evidence which
satisfied the jury. The supreme court reversed the trial court judgment,
citing Ryan for the proposition that presumptions affect only the bur-
den of producing evidence and once rebutted disappear. However, the
court carefully limited its holding to cases in which the benefit of the
presumption worked against the party having the burden of persuasion
on the issue. It reasoned that the only justification for giving an in-
struction on the presumption in such circumstances would be that the
presumption is evidence, and thus should be properly weighed against
the contrary evidence submitted by the opposing party." The court
concluded this was not consistent with its adoption of the Thayer-
Wigmore view of presumptions. The court therefore held that it was
reversible error to instruct the jury on a presumption where it operated
against the party having the burden of persuasion.4
In limiting its holding to a situation in which the presumption oper-
ates against the party bearing the burden of persuasion, the court did
not foreclose the possibility of an instruction to the jury and again
failed to adopt conclusively the Thayer-Wigmore theory. The limitation
is curious in that the court endorses Ryan, which involved a presump-
tion that operated in favor of the party who had the burden of persua-
sion. Nonetheless, the court in Caballero v. Litchfield Wood-Working
37. 236 Minn. 482, 53 N.W.2d 468 (1952), commented on in 37 MINN. L. REV. 629 (1953).
38. Id. at 490, 53 N.W.2d at 473.
39. Id. at 485, 53 N.W.2d at 469-70.
40. Id. at 491, 53 N.W.2d at 473 (dictum). The adoption of MINN. STAT. § 602.04 (1974),
which presumes due care for his own safety on the part of the decedent, may be indicative of the
legislative intent to overrule specifically the result in TePoel and Ran. Comment, Presumption
of Due Care by Decedent in Wronglid Death Action, 44 MINN. L. REv. 352, 354 (1959); see
Roeck v. Halvorson. 254 Minn. 394, 399, 95 N.W.2d 172, 176 (1959).
41. 236 Minn. at 493, 53 N.W.2d at 474.
1976]
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Co.2 hinted in a footnoted that TePoel may not apply where the burden
of persuasion coincided with the presumption. The court has failed to
use available opportunities to elaborate on this distinction. In Anderson
v. City of Minneapolis" it was determined that the statutory presump-
tion that sclerosis is an occupational disease when contracted by a
fireman disappears when rebutted by substantial evidence. 5 Although
it was error for the Industrial Commission to draw inferences from
the presumption, the court held that it was not prejudicial in light of
the record." Even though the presumption coincided with the burden
of persuasion, it disappeared when rebutted as did the presumption
in TePoel.47
A second opportunity to develop the limitation in TePoel was pre-
sented in Jones v. Peterson," a wrongful death action arising out of a
single-car, double-fatality automobile accident. The trustee of the
deceased, Shirley Jones, claimed that Jones was a passenger in a car
owned and driven by the deceased Helen Peterson. 9 Plaintiff, who had
the burden of proving that Peterson, and not Jones, was the driver of
the car, sought the benefit of the presumption that the owner of a car
involved in a fatal car accident was the actual driver of the car. 0 Based
on this presumption, the trial court instructed the jury that the defen-
dant had the burden of proving that Helen Peterson was not the driver
at the time of the accident.5 On appeal, defendants claimed that the
instruction, which shifted the burden of persuasion, was contrary to
the Ryan12 case and reversible error. 3 The only witnesses on the issue
gave testimony that would justify a finding that Jones, not Peterson,
was the driver of the car. Nonetheless, the judgment for Jones was
affirmed. The court reasoned that since the jury had apparently rejected
the witnesses' testimony, which had foundational weaknesses, the
treatment of the presumption as controlling the burden of persuasion
as opposed to the burden of producing evidence was a "distinction
without prejudicial difference."54
42. 246 Minn. 124,74 N.W.2d 404 (1956).
43. Id. at 127 n.4, 74 N.W.2d at 407 n.3.
44. 258 Minn. 221, 103 N.W.2d 397 (1960).
45. Id. at 227-28, 103 N.W.2d at 402.
46. Id.
47. See notes 37-41 supra and accompanying text.
48. 279 Minn. 241, 156 N.W.2d 733 (1968).
49. Id. at 245, 156 N.W.2d at 736.
50. See Sprader v. Mueller, 265 Minn. II1, 121 N.W.2d 176 (1963).
51. Jones v. Peterson, 279 Minn. 241, 245-46, 156 N.W.2d 733, 736 (1968).
52. See notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
53. Jones v. Peterson, 279 Minn. 241, 246, 156 N.W.2d 733, 736 (1968).
54. Id.
[Vol. 2
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The court again undercut the Thayer-Wigmore view. If the rule had
been properly applied, the presumption would have disappeared upon
the introduction of the defendant's competent, but not necessarily con-
clusive, evidence on the issue of the driver's identity. If the jury rejected
the defendant's evidence, there would be no evidence on this issue and
the issue should properly have been resolved against the plaintiff, the
party with the burden of persuasion.55 Instead, the presumption oper-
ated to shift the burden of persuasion. Although the court attempted
to limit its decision to the peculiar facts of the Jones v. Peterson case,
its rationale seemingly is applicable to any case in which the jury is
entitled to discredit the evidence rebutting the presumption and is thus
a clear departure from the Thayer-Wigmore view."
Subsequently, in Krinke v. Faricy,57 the burden of persuasion was
again shifted to a defendant, apparently because a presumption oper-
ated to the plaintiff's advantage. The plaintiffs" sought to establish
the existence of an easement for access to their property over a part of
the defendant's land. The trial court found for the plaintiffs who had
the burden of establishing their claims by clear and convincing evi-
dence.59 On appeal, the appellant claimed the evidence was insufficient
to support a finding of adverse or hostile use. In affirming the judg-
ment, the court relied on the well-established presumption of adversity
which arises from proof of open, visible, continuous, and unmolested
use inconsistent with the rights of the owner of the servient estate.60
The court stated the trial judge's finding of knowledge and acquiescence
by the owner of the servient estate was amply supported by the evi-
dence.6' Consequently, the court concluded that the burden of proving
the use was permissive rested with the defendant. This burden of proof
was characterized as the burden of persuasion.62 According to Krinke,
55. Once it is established that the owner of the car was present in the vehicle, the jury could
be permitted to draw the inference that the owner was driving. Such an inference would be
based on probabilities and the customary course of events. See Lunde v. Dwyer, 74 S.D. 559,
564-65, 56 N.W.2d 772, 775-76 (1953). But see Hahn v. Smith, 215 Wis. 277, 280-81, 254 N.W.
750, 751 (1934). However, the court does not permit such an inference but instead requires that
the inference be drawn.
56. See notes 5-11 supra and accompanying text. See also E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE 915-16 (1962).
57. - Minn. -, 231 N.W.2d 491 (1975).
58. Id. at ,231 N.W.2d at 492.
59. See, e.g., Engquist v. Wirties, 243 Minn. 502, 504 & n.2, 68 N.W.2d 412, 415 & n.1 (1955).
60. Krinke v. Faricy, - Minn. - , 231 N.W.2d 491, 492 (1975), quoting Dozier
v. Krmpotich, 227 Minn. 503, 507, 35 N.W.2d 696, 699 (1949).
61. Krinkev. Faricy,_ Minn .231 N.W.2d 491,492 (1975).
62. Id.
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the presumption of adversity shifts the burden of persuasion to the
other party.
From an historical viewpoint, the Krinke court's treatment of this
particular presumption is interesting. As early as 1896, the Minnesota
court in Swan v. Munch 3 recognized that continuous use of an ease-
ment for 20 years would be presumed to be under claim of right and
adverse. They further recognized the presumption would be deemed
sufficient to establish a right by prescription which, unless contradicted
or explained by opposing evidence, would be sufficient to establish the
presumption of a lost grant to the claimant. 4 The court in Swan,
allowed the presumption of adverse and hostile use to control only if
uncontradicted or unexplained-much like the operation of presump-
tions as found in Ryan, 5 TePoel,6 and federal rule 301. In Schmidt v.
Koecher, however, the court deviated from this view of presumptions,
allowing the presumption of adversity some effect despite direct testi-
mony of permissive use." Thirteen years later in Dozier v. Krmpotich"9
the court returned to the Thayer-Wigmore theory by treating a pre-
sumption as a rule of law controlling only if not rebutted. In Krinke,
however, the court again changed its position, allowing the presump-
tion to shift the burden of persuasion.
Based on Jones, Krinke, and certain language in TePoel, it could be
said that presumptions shift both the burden of producing evidence
and the burden of persuasion to the other party. This result appears
to be in direct conflict with the stated purpose of presumption as repre-
sented in Ryan and TePoel. Although inconsistent treatment of pre-
sumptions prior to Ryan and TePoel can be explained because the
court had not previously set forth the proper function of presumptions,
the continued inconsistent treatment after TePoel is difficult to reconcile.
IV. THE PROPOSED RULE
Twenty-three years after TePoel, the law regarding the role of pre-
sumptions is as confused and inconsistent as it was twelve years after
Ryan. The time has come again for a reconciliation. History suggests
that Minnesota's adoption of the federal rule may not be successful.
63. 65 Minn. 500,67 N.W. 1022 (1896).
64. Id. at 504, 67 N.W. at 1024. Accord, Dean v. Goddard, 55 Minn. 290, 297, 56 N.W. 1060,
1062 (1893).
65. See notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 37-41 supra and accompanying text.
67. 196 Minn. 178, 265 N.W. 347 (1936).
68. Id. at 182, 265 N.W. at 348-49.
69. 227 Minn. 503, 508, 35 N.W.2d 696, 699 (1949), citing Donea v. Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 220 Minn. 204, 212, 19 N.W.2d 377, 382 (1945).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently voiced support for the
Thayer-Wigmore view, yet departed from it in application. Neverthe-
less, by reducing the role of presumptions to a single, accessible rule,
problems can be isolated and the various factors which give rise to
these problems can be addressed and hopefully resolved.
Dean Gausewitz has suggested that inconsistent treatment of
presumptions since TePoel is inevitable because the reasons for the
creation of the presumptions, which range from mere procedural con-
venience to substantial social policy, vary in importance.70 However, in
analyzing a problem under the federal rule, a distinction must be made
between the presumption as a procedural device and the underlying
policy that gives rise to the presumption. If rule 301 is adopted, the
sole function of a presumption would be to control the burden of pro-
ducing evidence. This does not mean the underlying policy which gives
rise to the presumption, if substantial, should not have some additional
influence on the outcome of the litigation. However, this influence
should not be manifested by the use of presumptions but by other
procedural and substantive devices. For example, the policy which
gives rise to the presumption could justify placing the burden of per-
suasion on the opponent of the presumption. However, if the burden
of persuasion is placed upon the other party it is not because of the
presumption, rather it is because the underlying policy justifies it as a
matter of substantive law. Judges and legislators must analyze more
carefully to distinguish between the effects and use of burden of per-
suasion and presumptions. Such analysis has been lacking in the past,
as both the courts and legislatures have used the term "presumption"
as a catchall term for inferences and assumptions, as well as burden
of persuasion.
A recent example of the imprecision in the use of the term "pre-
sumption" is found in Mineral Resources, Inc. v. Mahnomen Con-
struction Co.,"' in which plaintiff sued for trespass and willful conver-
sion of gravel. The case was tried twice in district court. The first jury
found that the defendant was not a willful converter. The verdict was
set aside and after the second trial the jury found defendant to be a
willful converter.7" The trial judge had instructed the jury that since
there was a presumption that every trespass is willful, the defendant
had the burden of persuasion on the issue of willfulness.
7 3
70. See Gausewitz, supra note 12, at 402.
71. 289 Minn. 412, 184 N.W.2d 780(1971).
72. Id. at 414, 184 N.W.2d at 782.
73. Id. at 416, 184 N.W.2d at 783.
1976]
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The court affirmed74 the decision, although the instruction was
found to be contrary to TePoel since the presumption operated against
the defendent who had the burden of persuasion on the issue.75 The
court did not explain why the defendant had the burden of persuasion
on the issue of willfulness. The case is instructive not only because it
deals with the issues raised in TePoel, but because it is illustrative of
the manner in which the courts have confused the relationship between
presumptions and burden of persuasion. In tracing the origin of the
rule dealing with trespass, one finds that the courts have spoken
erroneously in terms of presumption in placing the burden of proof
on the defendant to show that a trespass was not willful. In Hoxsie
v. Empire Lumber Co.,"6 the court observed:77
If it appeared that the act of cutting was a trespass, the presumption,
in the absence of any contrary showing, would be that it was willful,
and the burden would be on the trespasser to show that it was not.
However, in Hoxsie the court clearly indicated 8 that the proof of good
faith is in the nature of mitigation of damages and it is generally
agreed that the defendant has the burden of proof on issues of mitiga-
tion of damages.7 The burden of persuasion is placed on defendant as
a matter of substantive law and not because of the presumption.
The courts have used the term presumption in other situations to
deal with matters of substantive law. 80 For example, the "presumption
of innocence" in a criminal case is not a presumption but a standard
used by the court to explain the government's burden to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.8 ' The basis of the presumption of legiti-
74. Id. at 416, 184 N.W.2d at 783.
75. Id. at417-18, 184 N.W.2d at 784.
76. 41 Minn. 548,43 N.W. 476 (1889).
77. Id. at 550,43 N.W. at 477.
78. Id. at 550,43 N.W. at 477.
79. See, e.g., Mass v. Board of Educ., 61 Cal. 2d 612, 627-28, 394 P.2d 579, 589, 39 Cal. Rptr.
739, 749 (1964); New York, Chicago & St. L. R.R. v. American Transit Lines, Inc., 408 Il. 336,
340, 97 N.E.2d 264, 266-67 (1951); Milligan v. Haggerty, 296 Mich. 62, 72, 295 N.W. 560, 564
(1941); Barron G. Collier, Inc. v. Kindy, 146 Minn. 279, 281, 178 N.W. 584, 585 (1920).
80. Thayer refers to legal maxims or general principles of legal reasoning which are some-
times inaccurately labeled as presumptions. THAYER, supra note 5, at 335. For instance, the prin-
ciple that ignorance of the law is not a legal excuse frequently is construed to be a presumption
that everyone knows the law. Electric Short Line Terminal Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 242
Minn. 1, 7, 64 N.W.2d 149, 153 (1954). Analogous are the presumptions that a sane man intends
the natural and probable consequence of his acts, State v. Mytych, 292 Minn. 248, 258, 194
N.W.2d 276, 282 (1972); State v. Weltz, 155 Minn. 143, 146, 193 N.W. 42, 43 (1923), and that
public officials will do their duty. Wagner v. Township of Carlos, 182 Minn. 571, 575, 235 N.W.
27, 28 (1931).
81. See McCormick supra note 4, at § 342. See generally State v. Sailor, 130 Minn. 84, 153
N.W. 271 (1915).
[Vol. 2
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol2/iss1/4
PRESUMPTIONS A ND THE NEW R ULES OF EVIDENCE
macy for a child born in wedlock is the substantial consideration in-
volving the protection of both the child and the marital relationship.8"
The courts have placed such importance on this underlying policy that
this particular situation now constitutes a "conclusive presumption,"
or a matter of substantive law. Except in the situation in which parent-
hood can be excluded by the proof of miscegenation, impotency, or a
blood test, the child is deemed to be a legitimate child of the husband
if the husband was living with the mother at the time of conception.83
Although the courts speak of the rule as one of presumption, they are
in fact dealing with a matter of substantive law.
Similarly, in child custody disputes there is a "presumption" that a
parent is a fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the care of the
child; the burden is upon the contestant to prove the contrary. 84 The
courts give great weight to intangible benefits that may be derived by
the love and affection of a natural parent. As a consequence the bur-
den is placed upon the contestant to show by satisfactory evidence that
the mother is unfit. Again it should be clear that the burden of persua-
sion is placed upon the contestant not because of a presumption, but
because the underlying policy considerations require it.
This type of analysis is not new. In Rustad v. Great Northern Rail-
way Co., 8 a fire destroyed goods that were being stored by defendant.
After determining that the duty of defendant had become one of a
warehouseman, the court considered the question of which party had
the burden of persuasion 8 on the issue of negligence. The court's
analysis is incisive:
87
This court has held that the burden of proof is upon the bailee to
prove that he exercised the degree of care required of him. [Citation
omitted.] Considerations of fairness put upon the warehouseman the
82. Haugen v. Swanson, 219 Minn. 123, 127, 16 N.W.2d 900, 902 (1944). A distinction is
made, however, between cases in which conception occurs prior to rather than during the mar-
riage. See Curry v. Felix, 276 Minn. 125, 130, 149 N.W.2d 92, 96 (1967). But see State v. E.A.H.,
246 Minn. 299, 307-08, 75 N.W.2d 195, 201 (1956).
83. See, e.g., State v. E.A.H., 246 Minn. 299,306, 75 N.W.2d 195, 200(1956).
84. See, e.g., In re Welfare of Barron, 268 Minn. 48, 53, 127 N.W.2d 702, 706 (1964); In re
Dependency of Klugman, 256 Minn. 113, 118, 97 N.W.2d 425, 428-29 (1959); State ex rel.
Platzer v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435, 438, 183 N.W. 956-57 (1921).
85. 122 Minn. 453, 142 N.W. 727 (1913).
86. Many jurisdictions deal with the same problem in terms of presumption; damage to the
goods raises a presumption that the bailee was negligent. See Nutt v. Davison, 54 Colo. 586,
588, 131 P. 390, 391 (1913); Donlan v. Clark, 23 Nev. 203, 205, 45 P. 1, 1 (1896); Brooklyn
Clothing Corp. v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 205 App. Div. 743, 747, 200 N.Y.S. 208, 211
(1923); English v. Traders' Compress Co., 167 Okla. 580, 581-82, 31 P.2d 588, 590 (1934); Hil-
debrand v. Carroll, 106 Wis. 324, 328, 82 N.W. 145, 146 (1900).
87. 122 Minn. at 456, 142 N.W. at 728.
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burden of proving his own freedom from negligence. The goods are
intrusted to him. He has charge and control of them. He determines
the manner of keeping them. He is in possession of such evidence as
there is as to the circumstances attending the loss. The bailor trusts the
warehouseman and has no proof. It is not unjust to the warehouseman
to require him to sustain the burden of proving its freedom from
negligence. Where the burden of proof should rest "is merely a question
of policy and fairness, based on experience in the different situations."
We hold that when the liability of the carrier has become that of a
warehouseman, and the loss of the goods shipped is established, the
burden of proof is upon it to show its freedom from negligence. [Cita-
tion omitted.]
There are other situations in which the policy that gives rise to the
presumption may require special treatment in addition to the creation
of the presumption. As previously discussed," a letter properly ad-
dressed, stamped, and mailed is presumed to have been duly delivered
to the addressee. The presumption is based in part on the probability
that the post office operated efficiently and delivered the letter. From
evidence of proper mailing, the jury may draw the inference that the
letter was received based on that probability. Because the trial judge
in Minnesota has some power to comment on evidence,8 it should be
permissible for the court to exercise that power by instructing the jury
that they are permitted, but not required, to draw such an inference. 0
Such an instruction is not justified because of the existence of a pre-
sumption, but because the underlying considerations that give rise to
the presumption also may permit the trial judge to exercise his power
to comment on the evidence even after the presumption has been
rebutted and disappears." In proposing the enacted federal rule, the
88. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
89. State v. Brady, 244 Minn. 455,462, 70 N.W.2d 449,453-54 (1955); Flick v. Ellis-Hall Co.,
138 Minn. 364, 366-57, 165 N.W. 135, 136-37 (1917). See 4 J. HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, MIN-
NESOTA PRACTICE, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, 5 G-S, Comment, (2d ed. 1974).
90. In Minnesota an inference has been defined as "a logical, permissible deduction from
proven or admitted facts." Wilder v. W.T. Grant Co., 270 Minn. 259, 260, 132 N.W.2d 852, 853
(1965). The jury will normally draw inferences as a matter of common sense without express
direction from the court. Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 245, 80 N.W.2d
30, 36 (1956) (failure to instruct on jury's right to draw inferences not error). Thus, the jury's
right to draw reasonable inferences may not be denied. Lindgren v. Voge, 260 Minn. 262, 269,
109 N.W.2d 754, 760 (1961). But see Kramer v. Kramer, 282 Minn. 58, 65, 162 N.W.2d 708,
713 (1968) (where reasonable persons can draw but one conclusion, the question is one of law
for the court). For a discussion of inferences see 1 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 3:2 (6th ed. S. Gard
1972); ;I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 300[01] (1975).
91. Such has been the practice in the criminal cases in Minnesota. See State v. Keaton, 258
Minn. 359, 363-65, 104 N.W.2d 650, 654-55 (1960); State v. Higgin, 257 Minn. 46, 51-52, 99
N.W.2d 902, 906-07 (1959). Because the recently promulgated MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03 subd. 18
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Senate contemplated instructing the jury in terms of permissible in-
ferences." Minnesota courts frequently direct the jury's attention to
inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.93 The failure of a
party to call certain witnesses to testify may permit the court to give
an instruction in terms of permissible adverse inferences that may be
drawn from such conduct.94 Similarly by codification, the doctrine of
res ipsa liquitor is implemented by an instruction in terms of permis-
sible inferences.
9 5
If the basis for the presumption is centered not in probability but in
social policy, it may be that the judge's power to comment would not
permit an instruction to the jury in terms of permissible inferences.
The propriety of such an instruction may give rise to controversy.
However, it must be understood that the resolution of such a problem
must be with reference to the power of the trial court to comment in a
given situation. The existence or non-existence of a presumption
should have no effect on such an analysis.
As predicted by Gausewitz, the legislature, along with the courts,
has accorded presumptions inconsistent treatment. Primarily as a re-
sponse to TePoel the legislature amended Minnesota Statutes Section
602.0496 to provide:
In any action to recover damages for negligently causing the death
of a person, it shall be presumed that any person whose death resulted
from the occurrence giving rise to the action was, at the time of the
commission of the alleged negligent act or acts, in the exercise of due
care for his own safety. The jury shall be instructed of the existence of
such presumption and shall determine whether the presumption is re-
butted by the evidence in the action.
restricts the court's power to comment on the evidence in criminal cases, this practice may be
discontinued. See MCCORMICK supra note 4, § 345, at 826 & n.66. But see Morgan, supra note
12, at 68. See also Daltex, Inc. v. Western Oil & Fuel Co., 275 Minn. 509, 515, 148 N.W.2d 377,
382 (1967).
92. The effect of the rule as adopted by the committee is to make clear that while evidence of
facts giving rise to a presumption shifts the burden of coming forward with evidence to rebut or
meet the presumption, it does not shift the burden of persuasion on the existence of the presumed
facts. The burden of persuasion remains on the party to whom it is allocated under the rules gov-
erning the allocation in the first instance.
The court may instruct the jury that they may infer the existence of the presumed fact from
proof of the basic facts giving rise to the presumption. However, irwould be inappropriate
under this rule to instruct the jury that the inference they are to draw is conclusive. S. REP. No.
1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9,10 (1974), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. FED. R. EVID. 804 (1975).
93. See note 90supra.
94. Zuber v. Northern Pac. Ry., 246 MINN. 157, 165-70, 74 N.W.2d 641, 649-52 (1956).
See 4 J. HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, 26 G-S, (2d ed. 1974).
95. MINN. R. Civ. P. 43.06.
96. Emphasis added.
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The underlined portion represents the amendment after TePoel and
was an attempt by the legislature to give the presumption evidentiary
effect. The statute leaves the jury with the problem of weighing the
sworn testimony against a legal presumption. The amendment has
precipitated much litigation and confusion. Several Minnesota
Supreme Court justices have urged its repeal 7 and the suggestion has
been made that the statute is unconstitutional. The interpretation of
the statute has been inconsistent and awkward. The court has decided
that the benefit of the presumption is available only to the plaintiff's
deceased suing in a wrongful death action even though the defendant
is also the representative of a deceased.99 In addition, a wrongful death
action can not be consolidated with claims asserted against the plain-
tiff's deceased °° to avoid the possible confusion that might result when
the jury is instructed that the deceased was presumed to be acting with
due care in his wrongful death action, but not in the other claims for
negligence. However, the decision in the wrongful death action can
estop any claims against the deceased. 10'
The statute was recently considered by the supreme court in Stein-
haus v. Adamson. 02 The court specifically overruled several previous
cases and held that the trial judge must always instruct the jury as to
the existence of the statutory presumption regardless of the recent
comparative negligence statute. If the jury determines that the pre-
sumption has been rebutted, it is to make its assessment of compara-
tive negligence without any consideration as to the effect of the pre-
sumption.0 3
The legislature can and should pass legislation to effectuate sound
social policy in the courts; however, the use of a presumption to ac-
complish this task has created an unworkable situation. The social
policy reasons underlying the presumption may be adequately imple-
mented in the trial of a lawsuit by properly placing the burden of per-
97. Steinhaus v. Adamson, 294 Minn. 387, 396, 201 N.W.2d 264, 270-71 (1972); Lustik v.
Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 517, 131 N.W.2d 741, 743 (1964); Lamback v. Northwestern Ref. Co.,
261 Minn. 115, 123-25, II N.W.2d 345, 351-52 (1961) (Knutson, C. J., concurring specially).
98. Steinhaus v. Adamson, 294 Minn. 387, 397, 201 N.W.2d 264, 271 (1972) (Todd, J., dis-
senting; see Roeck v. Halvorson, 254 Minn. 394, 399-400, 95 N.W.2d 172, 176-77 (1959). But
see Lott v. Davidson, 261 Minn. 130, 141-44, 109 N.W.2d 336, 344-45 (1961).
99. Jones v. Peterson, 279 Minn. 241, 245, 156 N.W.2d 733, 735-36 (1968). See generally
Lambach v. Northwestern Ref. Co. 261 Minn. 115, II N.W.2d 345 (1961).
100. Lambach v. Northwestern Ref. Co., 261 Minn. 115, 125, 111 N.W.2d 345, 351-52
(1961) (Knutson, C.J., concurring specially).
101. Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964).
102. 294 Minn. 387, 201 N.W.2d 264 (1972).
103. Id. at 396, 201 N.W.2d at 270-71.
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suasion on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the deceased was contributorily negligent. However, to instruct
the jury that the defendant must prove contributory negligence by a
preponderance of the evidence and rebut a legal presumption seems
more likely to confuse the jury than help them in their deliberations.
Furthermore, in passing the amendment, the legislature apparently
was concerned with the possibility that the doctrine of contributory
negligence would produce harsh results. With the passage of the com-
parative negligence statute," 4 however, the legislature has eliminated
much of its basis for concern that the deceased's representatives would
be precluded from recovering by a finding of slight negligence on behalf
of the deceased. Conversely, if the jury finds the deceased guilty of
substantial contributory negligence, the presumption would not and
should not assist the plaintiffs in recovering. Any reason for passage of
the statute in the first instance appears to be no longer viable and it
should be repealed. 105
V. CONCLUSION
The questions concerning burden of persuasion, presumptions, and
inferences are complex and confusing. The mere enactment of the pro-
posed rule will not end the confusion. The rule has defined the prob-
lems outside of the realm of presumption leaving them to be resolved
on other grounds. Nonetheless the rule constitutes a realistic and help-
ful starting point for the resolution of the very complicated and diffi-
cult problems raised. When faced with the problem of which party
should carry the burden of persuasion, the decision can no longer be
unthinkingly made with reference to whether or not there is a pre-
sumption. As in Rustad the resolution must be made based on con-
siderations of policy, probability, and fairness. Using this approach,
the result reached in Jones could be justified easily without regard to
whether or not there is a presumption. In most instances, when an
owner is being transported in one's personal car, the owner operates
as the driver of that vehicle. Moreover, the owner is in the best posi-
tion to foresee and to insure by purchasing insurance or otherwise,
against injuries created by the use of one's car. The requirement that
the trier of fact find for the plaintiff may be just and fair where there
is no credible evidence on the issue or the issue is in equilibrium. Ex-
104. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1974).
105. Adoption of the federal rule would not affect this statutory presumption. The language
in the rule makes it inapplicable when this rule conflicts with an existing statute. See note 7
supra and accompanying text. This is consistent with the enabling legislation which sought to
limit the court's rule making power in this area. See MINN. STAT. § 480.0591, subd. 6(c) (1974).
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haustive analysis is needed. Adoption of the proposed rule would be a
major step in isolating the true factors that must be considered when
making such an analysis.
Similarly, the adoption of the rule would apprise the legislature of
the true role of statutory presumptions. In determining how to imple-
ment certain policy considerations, the legislature could consider
which party in the litigation traditionally would carry the burden of
persuasion at trial. If, as in Steinhaus, the person against whom the
presumption operates also carries the burden of persuasion, the under-
lying policy for creating the presumption will be protected both at the
time when the court determines whether or not a directed verdict
should be entered and in the final determination by the trier of fact as
to which party prevails. If, on the other hand, as is found in the A nder-
son case, the presumption accompanies the burden of persuasion, the
statutory presumption will have no effect in the case where it is re-
butted by substantial evidence. If the legislature deems such treatment
to be an insufficient response to the policy considerations that underlie
the presumption, they could fix the burden of persuasion on the other
party or choose other vehicles to effectuate the policy.
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